Th e paper represents a complex analysis of public debt as one of the major tools of microeconomic policy, through which a modern state can directly or indirectly aff ect the condition and development of the national economy.
Analysis of the Concepts of Public Debt Infl uence on Macroeconomic Development
Th e issues concerning the optimal amount and structure of public debt and the consequences of its growth for the national economy have remained at the center of scientifi c discussions for many decades, and this therefore call for wise decisions during the development of debt policy in many countries. Moreover, the followers of various economic schools and trends oft en have quite contradictory views in respect of the consequences of public debt and budget defi cit. For example, the classic approach implied that a growing public debt was an absolutely negative phenomenon, whereas the representatives of the historic school (like the founder of fi nancial economics, A. Wagner) considered the defi cit funding of the public budget as a fairly progressive process (Afanasyev & Afanasyev, 2009; Wagner, 1909) . Th is opinion was held by J.M. Keynes, since, according to him, in the periods problematic for the economy, in order to maintain the necessary level of aggregate demand, public spending must grow to fund the budget defi cit and expand the amounts of public borrowings (Keynes, 1997) .
Considerable results were achieved by R.J. Barro (1997); P. Diamond (1965) (2003) . Th ey prove that a growing public debt may have both positive and negative consequences for the national economy. At the same time, none of the above researchers give reliable conclusions in relation to the threshold values of the amount of public debt which, if exceeded, cause change of infl uence vector. Linear dependence between the amount of public debt and the paces of economic growth in economically developed countries is proven by C. Patillo, H. Poirson and L. Ricci (2002) , who managed to calculate the threshold values of public debt on the case of the USA. Th e growing interest in the identifi cation of optimal threshold values of public debt is preconditioned by the developing debt crisis in EU countries (Misztal, 2010; Checherita & Rother, 2010) . As for the countries with forming markets, the interdependence between public debt was noted by M. Caner By and large, over the past few decades two approaches have formed in relation to the eff ect of public debt on the paces of economic growth (Kutivadze, 2012) . Th e fi rst one accentuates its important role in the stimulation of economic growth. In particular, it refers to the use of debt fi nancing tools in order to maintain a stable fi nancial system, increase public spending on human capital development and improve infrastructure. However, positive dynamics in the paces of economic growth is observed in cases where the public debt is little, whereas growth of debt liabilities is sure to aff ect the GDP indicators negatively (Patillo, Poirson, & Ricci, 2004) .
Th e second approach draws attention to the hazards of a growing public debt, since additional cash injections in the economy provoke the growth of interest rates, strengthen infl ation processes and can result in the so-called "crowding out eff ect" of private investments and thus contribute to the worsening of the process of capital formation and of the labor productivity growth indicators. Th us, the results of the research conducted by M. Kumar and J. Woo (2010) in relation to a group of countries (both developed and developing ones) over the period from 1970 to 2007 demonstrated that there is negative dependence between an increasing public debt and GDP growth. Th e obtained data, in particular, provides evidence that growth in the ratio of the amount of leverage to the GDP by 10 units results in an annual fall by 0.2 units of the real GDP level per capita. Moreover, analysis carried out by A. Schclarek on the data of 25 developed and 59 developing countries has demonstrated that in the latter there is direct negative dependence between a growing leverage and growing GDP, whereas in the developed countries no substantial interdependence has been identifi ed between these indicators.
Th ere is no shared vision among economic researchers about interdependence of these indicators. Th ere is an opinion (followed by W. Easterly (2001) , for example), that the feedback is there. Namely, the growth rate of public debt (and the condition of the latter) depends on the GDP growth indicators. In support of this standpoint, reference is made to a situation in the global economy in 1975, when a debt crisis, which struck countries with average income per capita in the 1980s and countries with low income in 1980-1990, was provoked by growth rates of the global economy slowing down. Th is position is shared by P. Krugman (2012) , who believes that whenever public debt grows no bad things happen to the growth, but it is exactly when there is decline in economic growth that bad things happen to public debt.
Our analysis clearly shows that according to most of the concepts which tackle the issues of how the amount of public debt aff ects the growth rates of the economy, countries with forming markets (including Russia) must be very careful when increasing their public debt and strive to keep its optimal structure by choosing the most effi cient tools for its fi nancing.
Macroeconomic Development Problems of the Russian Federation in the Conditions of Structural Misbalances and External Economic Shocks
Under the new economic conditions of the past few years, low growth rates have been common for the Russian economy (in comparison to previous periods). Th e main reasons for this have included persistent structural misbalances and considerable drops in the prices of the major Russian export goods. Th us, an average price of Urals oil in 2015 was $51. 23 , showing a substantial decline compared to 2014, when it was $97.6 (-47.5%).
Aft er a shock at the end of 2014, which was marked by a fall in the ruble and considerable increase in consumer prices 1 , since the beginning of 2015 and 1 At 2015 year end, the increase of consumer prices was 11.9% (data of the RF Ministry of Economic Development).
while the situation was stabilizing in the fi nancial sphere, the accent of the national economic policy was transferred to neutralize the consequences of external macroeconomic challenges, which negatively aff ected the operation results in the real sector of the Russian economy. Th us, as early as in the beginning of 2015, a set of actions was taken which included, among other things, neutralization of the eff ect of the sharp growth of interest rates on some sectors of the economy. However, through a budget maneuver, the RF Government managed both to stabilize the situation in the fi nancial market and partially improve the negative eff ects for the real sector. According to the Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation, it helped to remove the negative momentum from the correction of the internal demand and thus contributed to timely structural adaptation of the national economy to external shocks.
Nevertheless, in the fi rst fi ve months (from January untill May) of 2015, in comparison to the same period of 2014, the GDP decreased by 3.2%. Th e same thing was common for other indicators: there was a fall in the sphere of investments in fi xed capital (-4.8%), industrial production (-2.3%), and real disposable money incomes (-3.0%). Due to the cheapening Russian national currency and industrial embargo in the fi rst quarter of 2015, there was a considerable growth of consumer prices (on average by 16.9%). At the same time, according to the Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation, by the end of the year the growth level of consumer prices was 11.9%.
In January 2016 the GDP index was -0.1% of the previous month. Positive dynamics with seasonal correction was shown by industrial production as a whole. Th is was mainly due to production and distribution of electricity, gas and water. As for retail trade turnover, in the fi rst month of 2016, the decline rate, given the seasonal correction, was 0.2%, the same as in December 2015, which had been the minimal value since January 2015. Th e dynamics of chargeable services to the public did not change in January. Th e level of unemployment (excluding the seasonal factor) continued its December fall into January and was 5.6% of the economically active population.
In January, according to the estimate of the Ministry of Economic Development of the RF, the fall of the GDP in comparison to January of the previous year slowed down to 2.5% against 3.5% in December respectively. At the beginning of February, Rosstat published the fi rst evaluation of the GDP for 2015. Th e nominal volume of the produced gross domestic product was 80,412.5 billion rubles. In physical terms the GDP fell by 3.7%. Th e specifi c feature of the past year was the fact that the GDP dynamics were supported by external demand, whereas all the components of internal demand showed negative trends. Th e fall in domestic demand (by 10.3%) was compensated by a growth in exports (3.1%) and a sharp decline in imports (-25.6%), which is evidence of weak domestic demand too.
Expenses for fi nal consumption diminished by 7.9% as a whole, including the consumer demand of households (by 10.1), and the state (by 1.8%). Investment demand lowered by 18.3%, including gross fi xed capital formation (by 7.6%). At the end of 2015, the following structural shift s occurred in the GDP expenses: the share of consumer and investment demand shrank by 0.6% and 0.7% cor-respondingly; whereas the share of net exports grew by 1.3% (goods and services exports grew by 1.1% at a time when the share of imports reduced by 0.2%).
A negative eff ect on the general economic growth in 2015 was produced by a decrease in fi nancial activity, caused by a fall in the deposit and credit activity of economic agents.
Th e risks for the Russian economy remain. Th ese may be provoked by growing geopolitical tension in the world, which could cause more obstacles for Russian companies preventing their access to the global capital market and, in turn, becoming a stimulus for a fall in the value of ruble. Th us, a new rise in consumer prices and a general reduction in business activity may be provoked. Moreover, there is a hazard of a further fall in oil prices, which may speed up infl ation accompanied by growing tariff s of the natural monopolies, weaken the value of the Russian currency even more, cut down on investment activity and, consequently, contribute to further capital drain.
Th e basic scenario for 2016-2018 implies that the regime of economic sanctions in relation to the Russian Federation will continue. Th us, in this period the subjects of the Russian economy will function under conditions of limited access to the world credit market.
Vector Change in the Budget Policy of the Russian Federation in 2016-2019
Th e aforementioned negative eff ects for the Russian economy, preconditioned by the external macroeconomic challenges and the lack of structural reforms, required correction of the budget policy. In the second half of 2015, compliance with a conservative scenario in terms of indexation of budget expenses, to a point, diminished the negative cyclic impulse. Moreover, in 2015 in order to cover the federal budget defi cit and withdrawn fi nancial means, which it had planned to use on its fi nancing, the Russian government had to use the means of the Reserve Fund. Th is allowed, to some extent, a neutralizing of the negative eff ects provoked by a cardinal change in the external and internal macroeconomic conditions and winning additional time for adapting the level and structure of expenditure commitments to the existing budget facilities.
In order to ensure the long-term balance and sustainability of budgets, defi ne fi nancial capabilities for the required expenditure commitments, evaluate budget risks and take actions for their minimization, in 2015 an amendment to the Budget Code was adopted. It contains a requirement for the need to develop a long-term budget forecast.
It is supposed that this document will become a tool of a complex approach to managing budget sustainability, since it will improve the ability of the state budget to adapt to temporary macroeconomic fl uctuations (medium-term budget stability, suffi ciency of budget safety, expansion of the limits of budget maneuver (increased fl exibility in the structure of expenses).
Th e contents and signifi cance of macroeconomic and budget risks underwent quality changes in comparison to the previous budget cycle, which preconditioned the specifi cs of the budget policy implementation in 2016-2018. In this period, the major role of the budget is to activate the structural transformation of the Russian economy, which calls for relevant changes in budget expenses. Compliance with the conservative scenario in the part of formation of budget expenses will allow diminishing fl uctuations in the total amount of expenses, which will help to gradually reduce the federal budget defi cit.
At the same time, it is probable that in 2016-2019 the budget risks will remain high, which may result in short supply of revenues planned by the federal budget, reduction of the sources of defi cit fi nancing and the need for an increase in some areas of budget expenses.
As for the project of the federal budget for 2017 and the planned period of 2018-2019, then, in comparison to the year 2015, the revenues of the federal budget are expected to go down in 2019: from 16.9% to 15.0% of the GDP correspondingly (Table 1) . Reduced revenues of the federal budget are caused by projected worsening dynamics of oil and gas revenues, the amounts of which will decrease from 5.8% of the GDP in 2016 down to 5.4% in 2019. As illustrated in Table 1 , in the next budget cycle a gradual reduction of expenses in the federal budget is expected from 16,160 billion RUR down to 14,823 billion RUR (in nominal terms) correspondingly.
In addition, the next budget cycle will be marked by a change in the vector of the budget policy. Apart from budget consolidation, aimed at the reduction of expenditure obligations, the budget policy needs serious correction. In particular, a noticeable reduction of the "oil rent" calls for immediate change in the priorities of the budget expenses, most of which must be spent on restructuring the national economy.
Moreover, even though the budget defi cit is planned to be cut from 3,034 billion RUR in 2016 to 1,139 billion RUR in 2019, there are serious doubts if these projections are feasible, since now there are no reliable grounds to expect a recovery of growth in the Russian economy in 2017-2019. In this case a fi scal gap might be expected with a further growth of budget defi cit, which will result in decreasing long-term budget stability.
Dynamics of Public Debt and Debt Policy of Russia
Public debt is one of the system-forming components in the economy of any country, because its amount, structure and growth rate directly aff ect the devel-opment potential of all sectors of the national economy (Afanasyev & Krivogov, 2007; Shash & Afanasiev, 2014) . In the conditions of potentially growing budget defi cit and depleting reserves of the sovereign funds 2 the tasks appear related to the need for increasing the amount of debt fi nancing of budget expenses (including investment ones) (Shash & Afanasiev, 2014; Tatuev, Shash, Nagoev, Lyapuntsova & Rokotyanskaya, 2015). In the situation where the Russian economy remains in recession, constant growth of public debt is expected (Fig.) .
Figure

Dynamics of the RF public debt change
Source: website of the RF Ministry of Finance (www.minfi n.ru)
As you can see, public debt is growing (and will grow) largely due to a rise of domestic debt, which will be more than 57% in the period of 2015-2019, whereas the growth rate of external debt will stay within the limits of 11%. In September 2016, an additional issue of sovereign Eurobonds was placed, with a nominal value of $1.25 billion 3 . It is obvious that the current growth of public debt securities is caused by lower revenues from traditional items of Russian exports and by the attempts to fulfi ll the expenditure commitments in full. 2 Sovereign Wealth Fund and Reserve Fund of the Russian Federation. Th e Sovereign Wealth Fund is a state investment fund, whose fi nancial assets include stocks, bonds, property, precious metals and other fi nancial instruments. Th e Reserve Fund represents part of the means of the federal budget which must be accounted and managed independently in order to perform oil and gas transfer in case oil and gas revenues are insuffi cient for fi nancial provision of the above transfer.
3 Th e time of repayment of these debt instruments is 10 years, coupon yield is 4.7%. Apart from rising public debt, there is an annual growth of expenses on its servicing, because, due to a high interest rate of the Central Bank of Russia, the costs related to public debt servicing are growing too (2011 -2.4%, 2016 -3.3%, 2019 -5.3%). Despite the continuous growth of public debt, the values of Russia's external debt stability coeffi cients remain within the threshold values (Tables 2 and 3) and it has to be considered that in the conditions of lowering reserves of the sovereign funds, in a short period the country may fully use up the available "margin of safety" in the context of the planned growth of total public debt. At the same time, it should be considered that in 2015 and at the beginning of 2016 the strategy of budget defi cit fi nancing relied on the means of sovereign funds, since in this period the crediting activity was low. Analysis of the major funding sources of budget defi cit for the period of 2016-2019 ( Table 4 ) has shown that in this period there will be changes in its funding ratios, because it is planned that by the end of 2016 almost 70% of the budget defi cit will be compensated from sovereign funds, while by the end of the period (in 2019) almost 90% of the defi cit should be fi nanced at the expense of government debt liabilities.
Moreover, since the third quarter of 2016 the situation in the debt markets has started to stabilize and become accompanied by lower infl ation expectations and credit premiums. Th is is gradually causing change in the structure of defi cit fi nancing sources. Th us, the major objective of Russia's debt strategy for the next budget cycle (2017-2019) is the total transfer to market fi nancing the budget defi cit.
Transfer to a qualitatively new debt strategy agrees with modern fi nancing trends of the public budget defi cit, since the use of debt fi nancing tools has a distinct advantage. It consists of a fairly long gap between the attraction of fi nancial resources and the repayment of debt liabilities, which gives the government greater freedom of movement.
In this respect, until the end of 2019 the Russian government plans to use debt fi nancing tools more actively. Th us, for example, net fundraising on the domestic debt market will be 1.05 trillion RUR in 2017-2019. However, since in 2017 it will be time to repay public debt liabilities for the amount of 829 billion RUR, the net amount of borrowings will be 1.9 trillion RUR. As for the use of external borrowing tools, the main emphasis is planned to be made on supporting the liquidity of the sovereign Eurobond market. For 2017, the RF Ministry of Finance has decided to establish a limit on external borrowings equal to 7 billion USD.
According to some projections, even though the new debt strategy of Russia implies intensive growth of leverage, during its implementation in the next budget cycle the indicator of public debt will be within 20% of the GDP, which will not exceed the safe level. However, to solve the set problems, the Russian authori-ties need to keep the costs on public debt servicing lower than 10% and develop a number of actions for effi cient adaptation of the debt policy to the dynamically changing environment in the external and, especially, in the domestic fi nancial markets. For example, they must preclude the growth of short-term debt liabilities and their interest rates.
Macroeconomic Consequences of Debt Financing for the Russian Economy
Stability and predictability of the major macroeconomic variables is a crucial condition for ensuring favorable conditions for investments and faster economic growth. Moreover, in today's conditions, virtually every country in the world uses debt fi nancing of the economy in order to obtain additional resources, which are necessary to start modernization processes and stimulate economic growth.
Many researchers believe that countries with their own currency have no serious fi nancial limitations to public debt growth or capabilities for its refi nancing (for example, Groneck, 2010; Krugman, 1998) , because in such economies even relatively high values of public debt cannot break macroeconomic stability. However, this formula is not applicable for the countries with developing economies (including Russia). Countries with forming markets which use debt fi nancing to mitigate external shocks can have a directly opposite eff ect, when a poorly controlled growth of debt liabilities can provoke new macroeconomic shocks. In this respect, attention must be paid to the risks that can be entailed by growing debt fi nancing of the Russian economy.
One of the major hazards for Russia -a country with a large share of momentary revenues in the export structure -is in attempting to stimulate growth by making the debt larger. Th e result of such practice is the further pushing out of private investments and their substitution with public ones, which have proven to be rather ineffi cient in practice. Under the conditions of the constant debt financing of budget spending and growing debt liabilities, the state budget can end up as a tool of growth reduction, since the major problem of the continuously growing RF budget expenses is in the fact that most of them are not investments. Essentially, such actions activate the infl ation spiral, which will negatively aff ect real personal earnings further down the road.
Furthermore, there is the probability that if the Russian authorities actively attract fi nancial resources in the debt market, then, depending on the amounts of borrowings, interest rates will possibly go up, which will be causing further growth of expenses related to public debt servicing. Th us, for example, as early as today the interest rates for Russian debt liabilities comprise of 10-11%, whereas the total amount of public debt servicing expenses can reach 3.3% of the GDP or 4% of the expenditure budget at the end of 2016.
Growing amounts of borrowings can reduce the trust of investors in the Russian debt instruments (in the case where the budget gaps are compensated at the expense of new loans). In the case where the debt strategy orientated on the further growth of public debt continues, Russia risks getting in a "debt trap".
Under the conditions of limited fi nancial capabilities and slow economic recovery, the Russian government should take tough action aimed at reduction of the public budget defi cit. Th is is related to the fact that each percentage item of budget defi cit results in an analogous growth of the key rate of the Bank of Russia. Th us, a growing budget defi cit necessitates tougher actions in monetary policy, i.e. the "price" of budget defi cit is a growth of interest rates in the economy. By the end of 2016 the structural primary defi cit of the consolidated budget will be around 4.0% of the GDP. Th e results of a simulated long-term economic growth show that the share of budget expenses in the GDP has an inverse proportion to the potential economic growth rates. An additional adverse factor is a growing share of unproductive expenses, i.e. social spending, including expenses of the pension system. A stable growth is demonstrated by defense expenses and expenses related to security and support of the public sector, which have grown by 10% (from 49 to 59%) since 2008.
So the problem must be solved concerning minimization of the dependence of domestic macroeconomic conditions on the dynamics of external environment conditions, and budget policy must be adapted to the low price of hydrocarbon raw materials. In order to do this, the budget policy must become more rigid in terms of lowering the level of unproductive expenses, since the structure of the currently existing Russian expenditure budget does not correspond to the conditions for achieving long-term budget sustainability and planned indicators of economic growth.
Th us, the hypothesis about a possible improvement of economic effi ciency in the presence of a continuously growing public debt does not work for those countries with forming markets. It is especially true in cases where there is serious dependence of budget revenues on price misbalances in the raw material markets. In the case of Russia, an increasing amount of debt liabilities stimulates infl ation processes and decreases investment activities and, thus, produces a negative eff ect on the level of development of the real sector of the economy (at both national and regional levels), which may be the cause of macroeconomic instability and a longterm economic recession in the country.
